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BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW:
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AGAINST GENOCIDE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE’S JUDGMENT IN
CROATIA V. SERBIA (2015)
Ines Gillich*
ABSTRACT
This Article identifies and critically analyzes the
contributions the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made to
the international law against genocide via the judgment in
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) of
February 3, 2015. This Article elaborates on the concept of
genocide—a term that has originally been coined after the
Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust—and the protection
against this “crime of crimes” under international law. The
analysis section of this Article refers to the historical and
procedural context of the dispute between Croatia and Serbia
in the case, which originates from the violent conflict between
the two states following the dissolution of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The main section of
this Article criticizes the most important aspects of the ICJ’s
judgment, especially the Court’s assessment of the constituent
elements of genocide, the objective and the subjective
components, while also taking into account the ICJ’s prior
judgment in the Bosnian Genocide Case of 2007. The Article
concludes that the ICJ’s reasoning is in line with its prior
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Germany; LL.M., University of California at Los Angeles. I thank Professor
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judgment. However, the Article criticizes that the Court has
missed opportunities to clarify on questions of jurisdiction and
of its relationship with International Criminal Tribunals. It
also failed to shed light on the interpretation of the crime of
genocide as an international wrongful act of states with respect
to many important and highly controversial issues, thus
missing the opportunity to establish clearer guidelines for
many disputed aspects in the determination of genocide in
future disputes.
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I. Introduction
On February 3, 2015, the International Court of Justice
[hereinafter ICJ] delivered its judgment in the case brought by
Croatia against Serbia concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.1 The ICJ rejected—by fifteen votes to two—Croatia’s
claim that Serbia was responsible for committing genocide
during the armed conflict between Croatian and Serb forces in
regions that are now part of Croatia’s territory between 1991
and 1995. The ICJ also rejected Serbia’s counter-claim that
Croatia, in turn, should be held responsible for committing
genocide during a military operation in 1995. The ICJ
concluded that, even though the acts committed by both parties
fulfilled the physical element of genocide (actus reus), the
mental element (mens rea)—which requires a specific intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group—was lacking on
the side of both states.
Even though the decision technically only binds the two
parties, its significance reaches far beyond the dispute. This is
because genocide cases against states (unlike cases against
individual perpetrators) are seldom brought before
international courts. This case, therefore, provided the ICJ
with the opportunity to further sharpen the contours of
genocide under the Genocide Convention.2 Grabbing this
chance, the ICJ meticulously elaborated on the constituent
elements of genocide as well as on important questions of proof
and evidence. In addition to the difficulties in determining the
substantive elements of this international crime, a
jurisdictional problem further complicated the case: the ICJ
was asked to assess acts that had been committed before
1 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Merits, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 118 (Feb. 3),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/118/18422.pdf [hereinafter Judgment].
2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
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Serbia became a party to the Genocide Convention. As a
general principle, the Genocide Convention binds only state
parties with respect to acts that took place after the date when
the state becomes a party to the Convention.3 Moreover, the
Convention not only sets out the substantive legal obligations
with respect to genocide but also provides the only legal basis
for the ICJ’s jurisdiction.4
The following analysis first provides an insight into the
characteristics of genocide under international law, in
particular under the Genocide Convention. The Article then
comments on the most important aspects of the judgment and
discloses the highlights and flaws in the Court’s reasoning. The
Articles argues strength of the judgment lies in the Court’s
systematical assessment of the objective and subjective
elements of genocide. Another positive feature is that the
Court’s interpretation of main elements of genocide is in line
with its prior judgment on genocide in 2007 and so contributes
to consistency and objectivity. One of the main flaws of the
judgment is the ICJ’s treatment of the jurisdictional challenges
concerning acts that took place before the respondent state
Serbia became a party to the Genocide Convention. The Court’s
arguments in favor of establishing jurisdiction are not
convincing. In particular, the Court violates the principle of
state consent upon which jurisdiction is based, because the
Genocide Convention did not bind Serbia at the time when
some of the alleged acts took place. The Article then goes on to
criticize the ICJ’s vast reference to the jurisprudence of
International Criminal Tribunals and prosecutorial decisions.
Theses references are problematic because International
Criminal Tribunals are only concerned with the international
criminal responsibility of individuals for genocide. The case
before the ICJ, in contrast, concerns an international wrongful
act of a state, which is structurally and substantively different
with respect to its interpretation of the elements of genocide.

3 Id. at art. XIII (detailing terms of entry of the Convention into force
with respect to signatories thereto).
4 Id. at art. IX (“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention . . . shall
be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the
parties to the dispute.”).
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The Article also argues that the ICJ interprets some elements
of genocide too narrowly without the need to do so. In addition,
the Court has failed to shed light on the interpretation of the
crime of genocide as an international wrongful act of states
with respect to many important and highly controversial
issues, thus missing the opportunity establish clearer
guidelines for many disputed aspects in the determination of
genocide in future cases.
II. Genocide under international law
Genocide is often called the “crime of crimes”5 because it
retains—apart
from
legal
relevance—great
symbolic
significance. The use of the word genocide is associated with a
certain moral stigma. It immediately invokes images of horrors
and cruelties. This is why states either deliberately employ or
studiously avoid using the word genocide in their international
relations.6
A. Origins of the term ‘genocide’
The polish legal scholar Raphael Lemkin invented the
term “genocide” in 1944.7 He composed it from the Latin “gens,
5 See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No.: ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and
Sentence,
¶
16
(Sept.
4,
1998),
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/KAMBANDA_ICTR-9723/KAMBANDA_ICTR-97-23-S.html; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No.
ICTR 98-39-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 15 (Feb. 5, 1999),
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/SERUSHAGO_ICTR-9839/SERUSHAG O_ICTR-98-39-S.htm; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 227 (2d ed. 2009) (calling genocide
the “crime of crimes” without implying that there is a hierarchy of
international crimes) [hereinafter CRIME OF CRIMES].
6 See Jim Acosta & Kevin Liptak, Obama won’t call it Armenian
‘genocide’ on 100th anniversary of atrocity, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015, updated 9:08
PM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/21/politics/obama-armenian-genocide100th-anniversary (reporting that, in the course of the public commemoration
of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, politicians deliberately
avoided the term genocide to describe the atrocities committed by the
Ottoman Empire to the Armenian population during WWI).
7 See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 91-93 (1944)
(providing an extensive legal analysis of German rule in countries occupied
by Nazi Germany during the course of World War II along with the definition
of the term genocide) [hereinafter AXIS RULE].
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gentis” or the Greek root “génos”, meaning “birth, race, stock,
kind” and from the Latin ending –cidium, which means cutting
or killing.8 Lemkin had the experience of the Assyrian
massacre committed by the Ottoman army between 1914-1923
and in 1933 and the Holocaust committed by Nazi Germany
during WWII in mind.9 Defining genocide, Lemkin wrote:
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the
immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by
mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to
signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups,
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The
objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the
political and social institutions, of culture, language, national
feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups,
and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health,
dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such
groups.10
It is interesting to note that even though the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg mentions the
term genocide and, moreover, some prosecutors used it in their
Statements of the Offense, the Nuremberg Tribunal’s final
judgment rather employs the term “crimes against humanity”
and not genocide to deal with the persecution and physical
extermination of national, ethnic, racial and religious
minorities.11

B. Genocide as a concept of international law
In the aftermath of the Nuremberg Trials, the UN General
Assembly finally took up Lemkin’s idea of genocide as an
international crime and passed a resolution calling for the
preparation of a convention on genocide.12 The Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was
signed on December 9, 1948 and entered into force on January
8 See ANTONIO CASSESE ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL
AND COMMENTARY 200 (2011) (explaining the etymology
9

2012).
10
11
12

RAPHAEL LEMKIN, LEMKIN ON GENOCIDE

CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
of the term genocide).
vii (Stephen L. Jacobs ed.,

LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 7, at 79.
SCHABAS, CRIME OF CRIMES, supra note 5, at 36-42.
UN GA Res. 96 (I), UN Doc. A/RES/96(I) (Dec. 11, 1946).
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12, 1951.13 Its current number of 146 member states evidences
the international community’s overwhelming condemnation of
genocide.14 The Genocide Convention is the first international
treaty to embrace the idea of genocide as a crime under
international law.15 The preamble of the Convention makes
this clear when stating that the state parties consider
“genocide . . . a crime under international law, contrary to the
spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the
civilized world.”16 Article I of the Convention also confirms
“that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war, is a crime under international law” and establishes the
states parties’ obligation to “undertake to prevent and to
punish” genocide.17 Article II is the heart of the Convention,
because it defines genocide as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III then lists five prohibited modalities of the
commission of genocide (genocide itself, conspiracy to commit
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide).18
Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at 278.
For a list of state parties see International Committee of the Red
Cross, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 9 December 1948, TREATIES, STATE PARTIES AND COMMENTARIES,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?
xpviewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=357
(last
visited Dec. 1, 2015).
15 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1.
16 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at Preamble.
17 Id. at art. 1.
18 Id. at art. 1.
13
14
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Finally, Article IX contains an important jurisdictional
clause by which the states parties accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to “disputes relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in
article III.”19
Genocide can be committed both in times of peace and in
times of war.20 It is also prohibited under customary
international law and the prohibition is generally deemed to be
ius cogens, a norm of a higher rank, from which no derogation
is allowed.21 It is noteworthy that the prohibition of genocide
under customary international law, however, may differ from
its contents under treaty law.22
Genocide is closely related to the right to life, a
fundamental human right which is protected in many
international human rights conventions and declarations.
Consequently, genocide is also a matter of international human
rights law.23 Nonetheless, a structural difference exists in that
Id. at art. IX.
Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 1 (affirming genocide can be
committed “in time of peace or in time of war”). On the relationship between
genocide and the laws of war, see the discussion below at IV B 6.
21 See Reservations
to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15,
23 (May 28), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf [hereinafter
Reservations] (contemplating that “underlying the Convention are principles
which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without
any conventional obligation”).
22 This issue has not been resolved yet in practice or in literature. See
generally JOHN DUGARD, Retrospective Justice: Law and the South Africa
Model, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES
273 (James McAdams ed., 1997) (noting that “it is by no means certain that
the Genocide Convention . . . has itself become part of customary
international law.”).
23 See e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art.
6(2) (“In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of
death may be imposed . . . not contrary to the provisions of the present
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide”); 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 6(3) (“When deprivation of life
constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this Article
shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any
way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”).
19
20
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human rights treaties are in principal concerned with the
rights of a single individual whereas genocide is associated
with the right to life of particular human groups. Moreover,
genocide is not only deemed as an offense against the protected
groups as such, but also as an offense against the entire
international community (erga omnes).24
Another important distinction to be made is between
genocide as an international wrongful act of states leading to
state responsibility on the one hand and genocide as an
international
crime
leading
to
individual
criminal
responsibility on the other hand. Genocide is warranted as an
international crime for which individual persons may be
prosecuted in the statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). These statutes have in common that they
reproduce the definition of genocide from Article II of the
International
criminal
law
Genocide
Convention.25
distinguished genocide from crimes against humanity, such as
persecution, by its specific “intent to destroy” a protected group
in whole or in part. This specific mental element in the
definition of genocide demonstrates the elevated wrongfulness
and seriousness of this crime.26
The different legal bases—international criminal law and
international public law—also lead to substantial differences
between the genocide as an individual crime and genocide as
an international wrongful act of a state. International legal
scholarship still falls short of addressing many of these
differences in detail. One difference may arise regarding the
See Reservations, supra note 21, at 23-24 (discussing the genesis of
the concept of obligations erga omnes for jus cogens crimes).
25 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 4, amended by S.C. Res. 1411, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411 (2002);
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Statute of the International
Criminal Court, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (entered into force July 1,
2002) (sanctioning the crime of genocide).
26 See generally KAI AMBOS & STEFAN WIRTH, Sentencing, Cumulative
Charging, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, in ANNOTATED LEADING
CASES: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994–1999,
VOL. II 703 (André Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001) (commenting on the
structure of genocide in comparison to other crimes).
24
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specific genocidal intent requirement: since a state as such
cannot commit genocide itself, but only through individuals,
genocide as a state act necessarily raises questions of
attribution. Therefore, as a wrongful act of states, genocide,
either requires the existence of a genocidal state policy or a
pattern of widespread and systematic violence against a
protected group from which genocidal intent can be inferred.
In contrast, the ICJ has held that the individual crime of
genocide can be committed even in absence of genocidal policy
of the state or a collective act of violence.27
III. The ICJ’s treatment of challenges to its jurisdiction
The ICJ only rarely has occasion to decide disputes
concerning genocide. Apart from the present case, the ICJ’s
judgment in the case concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
of 2007 is particularly relevant. In that case the Court found
for the first time a state (the former state union of Serbia and
Montenegro) to be in breach of the Genocide Convention and,
moreover, made important remarks on the interpretation of the
constitutive elements of genocide.28 One of the reasons why the
ICJ is only rarely concerned with cases of genocide is its
limited jurisdiction. Unlike the obligatory jurisdiction of
national courts, jurisdiction of international courts is based on
the consent of the states.29 This means that states have to
27 Cf. Paola Gaeta, On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible
for
Genocide?,
18
EUR.
J.
INT’L
631,
631
(2007),
http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/18/4/236.pdf (arguing that the crime of genocide can
be committed regardless of the existence of a state genocidal policy, whereas,
in contrast, the state’s international responsibility necessarily requires such
a policy).
28 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43
(Feb. 26), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf [hereinafter Bosnia
Judgment]; see generally Claus Kress, The International Court of Justice and
the Elements of the Crime of Genocide, 18 EUR. J. INT’L 619 (2007),
http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/18/4/238.pdf (criticizing the Bosnia Judgment)
[hereinafter Elements of Genocide].
29 Status of Eastern Carelia Case, Advisory Opinion, (1923) P.C.I.J. Ser.
B., No. 5, at 27 ("[i]t is well established in international law that no State
can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes . . . either to
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agree to the ICJ’s judicial supervision.30 Jurisdiction in the
present case was based on Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute,
which provides that “the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all
matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in
force.”31 Article IX of the Genocide Convention serves as a
jurisdictional clause.
A major admissibility problem in the case under analysis
arose because the allegations made by Croatia concerned acts
that had been committed before Serbia became a party to the
Genocide Convention and, therefore, become bound by the
obligation not to commit genocide and by the jurisdictional
clause of Article IX. This issue was not problematic in the
former case, the Bosnian Genocide Case of 2007, because in
that case the allegations concerned only acts committed after
the Serbia acceded to the Genocide Convention. In order to
better understand this problem, some remarks on the historical
and procedural background of the dispute between Croatia and
Serbia need to be made.
A. Historical Background: the break-up of the SFRY
The allegations raised by Croatia concern events that took
place in the aftermath of the break-up of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s. Following
violent political and social tensions, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia
and Macedonia declared their independence from the SFRY
and became independent states between 1991 and 1992.
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were admitted
as UN member states on 22 May 1992, while Macedonia was
admitted as a UN member state on 8 April 1993.32
On 27 April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro, formed the
union of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which
mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement"); see
also Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America,
(U.S. v. Hungary), Removal from the list, Order, 1954 ICJ Rep 103 (Jul. 12).
30 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) (listing
the different forms in which consent may be given).
31 Id.
32 Press Release, United Nations, United Nations Member States, No.
ORG/1469 (Jul. 3, 2006), http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/org1469.doc.htm.
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would be renamed into Serbia and Montenegro later in 2003,
gained sovereignty. At first, the FRY claimed to be the (only)
legal continuator of the former SFRY, and not merely—like the
other entities—a successor state of the SFRY.33 Being a legal
continuator would have meant that the FRY would have
maintained the identical legal personality, and thus would
have automatically possessed all existing rights and obligations
of the SFRY. In contrast, the FRY, as a mere successor state,
would have to be treated as an entirely new state. As a
consequence, it would not have automatically inherited all the
righs and obligations of the prior SFRY. The other ex-Yugoslav
States and the international community—though not
unequivocally—rejected the FRY’s identity claim and requested
the FRY to apply anew for UN Membership.34 After having
done so, the FRY was admitted to the United Nations on
November 1, 2000.35 In 2006, Montenegro seceded from the
state union to become an independent state while Serbia
continued the legal personality of the FRY (i.e. Serbia was
undisputedly regarded as being identical with the former
FRY).36
B. Procedural history of the case
On July 2, 1999, Croatia filed an application with the ICJ
against the FRY alleging violations of the Genocide Convention
that took place between 1991 and 1995. On November 18, 2008,
the ICJ rendered a decision on preliminary objections raised by
Serbia against the Court’s jurisdiction. Serbia had raised the
objections
(1) that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction over the claims brought against
the FRY,
33 Statement of 27 April 1992 by the Joint Session of the SFRY
Assembly, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the Assembly
of the Republic of Montenegro, U.N. Doc. A/46/915, Ann. II.
34 See G.A. Res. 47/1 (Sept. 22, 1992) (determining that “the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in the UN”).
35 G.A. Res. 55/12 (Nov. 10, 2000).
36 MARKO MILANOVIC, Territorial Application of the Genocide Convention
and State Succession, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 488
(Paola Gaeta ed., 2009).
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(2) that alternatively, the ICJ lacks jurisdiction over claims in
respect of acts committed before 27 April 1992, and
(3) that the claims referring to taking effective steps to submit to
trial certain individuals and return of cultural property are
inadmissible and moot.37

The ICJ determined that after the secession of Montenegro
from the state union with Serbia, Serbia was the sole successor
state of the FRY/Serbia and Montenegro, and, therefore the
right respondent in this case.38 The ICJ determined that it had
jurisdiction to rule on Croatia’s claim in respect of acts
committed after 27 April 1992, the date when the FRY came
into existence as a separate state. The ICJ also held that by
that date, the FRY/now Serbia became a party, by succession,
to the Genocide Convention.39 With respect to Serbia’s objection
that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction with regard to acts that had
been committed before 27 April 1992, the ICJ reserved its
decision on its jurisdiction to the final judgment.40
C. The problem of the admissibility ratione temporis
In the judgment under analysis, the ICJ again affirmed
that the respondent Serbia was not the legal continuator, but
rather a successor state of the SFRY. Therefore, Serbia did not
continue to automatically inherit the legal rights and
obligations of the SFRY. The Court then acknowledged the
Genocide Convention does not apply to acts of a state before the
state has become a party to the Convention. Consequently, the
Court determined that Serbia became a party to the Genocide

37 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), 2008 I.C.J. Rep. Preliminary
Objections,
Judgment,
¶
21
(Nov.
18),
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/118/14891.pdf
[hereinafter
Preliminary
Objections
Judgment].
38 Id. at ¶ 34 (referring to statements made by the Serbian President
and government members that Serbia will continue all memberships and
international commitments inherited from the FRY).
39 See id. at ¶ 11 (concluding from statements of FRY officials that “the
FRY had thus “clearly expressed an intention to be bound . . . by the
obligations of the Genocide Convention” and that “the 1992 declaration must
be considered as having had the effects of a notification of succession to
treaties, notwithstanding that its political premise was different”).
40 Id. at ¶ 146.
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Convention in its own right only as of 27 April 1992.41
Consequently, according to a strict reading of Article IX, which
grants the ICJ jurisdiction over the Genocide Convention in
this case, the ICJ would have had to reject its jurisdiction over
the alleged acts that took place before that date. Article IX
establishes that
disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in
article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of
Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

The ICJ, however, did not follow this narrow interpretation of
Article IX. Instead, the Court’s argument took an interesting
twist: it asked whether jurisdiction under this clause
nevertheless is established by means of devolution of the
SFRY’s responsibility for the alleged violations of the Genocide
Convention onto Serbia. The SFRY had been a party to the
Genocide Convention since 1950. Croatia had raised two sets of
arguments in favor of this position, which the ICJ now had to
deal with. First, Croatia had argued that the acts before 27
April 1992 had been committed by a successful insurrection
movement, in the process of the dissolution of the SFRY.
Croatia invoked Article 10(2) of the ILC Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
which provides that “the conduct of a movement, insurrectional
or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in part of
the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its
administration shall be considered an act of the new State
under international law.”42
According to Croatia, the conduct of this insurrection
Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶ 95-100.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 10(2), in Report of the International Law
Commission, Fifty-Sixth Session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001,
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No.
10 [2001], U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Ch. V (19 Sept. 2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles]
(providing that “the conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which
succeeds in establishing a new State in part of the territory of a pre-existing
State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered an act of
the new State under international law.”).
41
42
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movement, by operation of the legal principle embodied in this
provision, should be attributable to Serbia.
The ICJ rejected this argument and rightly noted that the
customary law status of this provision is highly controversial.43
In fact, the ILC Articles are a result of a long-term study
conducted by the International Law Commission, a body of
individual experts on international law, in an attempt to codify
customary international law. In 2001, the ILC presented its
draft to the UN General Assembly. But the ILC Articles were
never included in a binding international treaty and the
General Assembly has never taken position on the customary
law status of these articles, making their legal status highly
doubtful.44
The ICJ went on to note that
even if Article 10 (2). . .could be regarded as declaratory of
customary international law at the relevant time, that Article is
concerned only with the attribution of acts to a new State; it does
not create obligations binding upon either the new State or the
movement that succeeded in establishing that new State. 45

The Court’s view is right because the underlying rationale of
this provision is to maintain the organic or structural
continuity between the insurrectional movement and the new
state.46 Thus, devolving attribution of the successful
insurrection movement onto the new state ensures that a legal
subject, that can be held responsible for an illegal act,
continues to exist. Therefore, Article 10 (2) applies only with
regard to an already existing international obligation, which
43 See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL
PART 176-178 (2014) (discussing the controversies concerning Article 10 of the
ILC Articles); see also Patrick Dumberry, New State Responsibility for
Internationally Wrongful Acts by an Insurrectional Movement, 17 Eur. J. Int’l
605, 607 (2006) (“Writers generally agree with the principle of the devolution
of responsibility in the context of governmental changes. They, however,
rarely address the other question of whether the same principle should apply
in cases where actions of rebels result not in a change of government, but in
the creation of a new state.”).
44 Cf. James Crawford et al., The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion of the Second Reading,
21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963, at 963 (2001) (noting the General Assembly’s lack of
comments).
45 Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶ 104.
46 Dumberry, supra note 43, at 608.
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has been established elsewhere, but it does not establish such
an obligation itself.
The ICJ then addressed Croatia’s second, and alternative
legal argument. Croatia argued that, on 27 April 1992, when
the FRY/Serbia claimed to be the legal continuator of the SFRY
and that it would succeed to the treaty obligations of the SFRY,
it also succeeded to the responsibility incurred by SFRY for the
alleged violations of the Genocide Convention.47
The ICJ’s reasoning on this point, which will be analyzed
now, was one of the most controversial issues of the entire
judgment, as evidenced by the voting scheme (eleven Judges
voted in favor, six Judges voted against the admissibility) and
the six separate opinions.48 The ICJ is to be criticized for not
having taken a clear and unambiguous position on this
important issue. Instead, the ICJ stated rather cryptically:
It is true that whether or not the Respondent State succeeds . . .
to the responsibility of its predecessor State for violations of the
Convention is governed not by the terms of the Convention but
by rules of general international law. However, that does not
take the dispute . . . outside the scope of Article IX . . . The
disputes subject to that jurisdiction are those “relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the Convention, but it
does not follow that the Convention stands alone. In order to
determine whether the Respondent breached its obligations
under the Convention . . . and, if a breach was committed, to
determine its legal consequences, the Court will have recourse
not only to the Convention itself, but also to the rules of general
international law on treaty interpretation and on responsibility
of States for internationally wrongful acts . . . The Court
considers that the rules on succession that may come into play in
the present case fall into the same category as those on treaty
interpretation and responsibility of States . . . The Convention
itself does not specify the circumstances that give rise to the
responsibility of a State, which must be determined under
general international law . . .49

The ICJ concluded that a finding that there is a dispute
between the Parties “concerning the interpretation, application
Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 82, 106.
See Judgment, supra note 1 (separate opinions issued by Judges
Tomka, Xue, Skotnikov, Owada, Sebutinde and Kreca).
49 Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶ 115.
47
48
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or fulfilment of the Convention, which includes disputes
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide” would
suffice for purposes of determining its jurisdiction.50
The ICJ determined that the question of whether or not
the FRY/Serbia succeeded to the responsibility of the SFRY is a
matter to be addressed in the merits, after having assessed
that the SFRY had in fact violated its obligations under the
Genocide Convention.51
The ICJ’s argument is problematic for a number of
reasons. Before turning to the critique, a few clarifying words
on the issue of state succession need to be made.
Whenever a state ceases to exist (as in the SFRY in the
instant case) and is replaced by another state which has a
distinct legal personality but is not the legal continuator in the
territory of the former state (i.e. the FRY/Serbia), a question
arises as to whether the rights and obligations of the former
state devolve with respect to the new state.52 This situation is
generally referred to as state succession. The process of state
succession can be broken apart into several distinct legal
aspects, such as succession to treaties, to property, to debts, to
international organizations, etc. These aspects are governed by
customary international law, part of which is also codified in
international treaties.53
The present case, however, differs from the above
situation. The present case is not about whether or not Serbia
has taken the place of the SFRY as a party to the Genocide
Convention. The ICJ has answered this issue in the negative
by stating that Serbia is bound to the Genocide Convention in
Id. at ¶ 111.
See id. at ¶ 112 (identifying three contested points to be addressed in
the merits: “(1) whether the acts relied on by Croatia took place; and, if they
did, whether they were contrary to the Convention; (2) if so, whether those
acts were attributable to the SFRY at the time that they occurred and
engaged its responsibility; and (3) if the responsibility of the SFRY had been
engaged, whether the FRY succeeded to that responsibility.”).
52 See e.g. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties, art. 2(1)b), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E./10 (defining state succession
as “the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the
international relations of territory”).
53 See
generally PATRICK DUMBERRY, STATE SUCCESSION TO
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 5-9 (2007) (explaining legal aspects of state
succession).
50
51
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its own right, i.e. by acceding the Convention as of 27 April
1992. The present case concerns the question of whether Serbia
has succeeded in the obligations arising from the (already
established) violation of the Genocide Convention by the SFRY
before 1992. In other words: Can the consequences of the
international responsibility for a breach of the Genocide
Convention committed by the SFRY be transferred onto Serbia
as a different legal personality?
The ICJ answered this question neither in the affirmative
nor in the negative. Instead, the Court argued that at least the
existence of a mere dispute regarding the controversial issue of
state succession to responsibility is sufficient to establish
jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
The ICJ’s broad interpretation of Article IX, however, is
not covered by the terms of this clause. Article IX is a typical
example of a so-called compromissory clause. Jurisdiction
based on such a clause is by its nature limited and narrow.54
This is because jurisdiction of the ICJ is intrinsically linked to
the consent of the state parties.55 Naturally, when it comes to a
dispute, applicants will try to argue to give the Court as wide a
jurisdiction as possible, whereas respondents will strive for a
much more restrictive exercise of jurisdiction.56 Therefore, for
reasons of objectivity, consent must be sought primarily in the
terms of such a compromissory clause, which must not be
interpreted against its wording.
A stricter and more literal interpretation, however,
suggests that the “dispute” referred to in Article IX must be
between the Contracting Parties, in this case Serbia and
Croatia, and it must concern the „interpretation, application
and fulfilment of the Convention” by exactly these parties.57
The acts in questions (before 1992), however, do not trigger the
fulfillment of the Convention by Serbia, but by the SFRY. The
SFRY is, as the ICJ itself determined, not the legal predecessor
54See ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 432 (2014)
(commenting on the basis for the ICJ’s jurisdiction).
55 Id.
56 See id. (referring to the ICJ case Pulp mills on the Uriguay River
(2010) as an example to illustrate the opposition between the parties’
interests on the one hand and the Court’s cautious attidute in affirming its
jurisdiction on the other hand).
57 Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka, at ¶ 22).
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of Serbia, but a different legal entity, which has ceased to exist.
For these reasons, the ICJ’s view that, in order to establish
jurisdiction, it was sufficient that the SFRY (and not Serbia)
was party to the Genocide Convention at the time the acts were
committed58, must be rejected.
Also unsatisfactory is the Court’s construction of the scope
of Article IX to include issues of state succession to
responsibility by simply declaring that “the rules on succession
that may come into play in the present case fall into the same
category as those on treaty interpretation and responsibility of
States.”59 The Court fails to provide support for its view that
state succession to international responsibility was governed by
customary international law.60 Existing state practice on this
issue is ambiguous.61 Legal doctrine does not provide a
satisfying answer either. As James Crawford stated: “It is
unclear whether a new State succeeds to any State
responsibility of the predecessor State with respect to its
territory.”62 The fact that rules of state succession to
responsibility
are neither contemplated in international
treaties nor in other codifications of international law makes
this area controversial.
Admittedly, one could argue in favor of devolution of state
responsibility that the international wrongful act must not
remain unpunished because of the application of the rules of
State succession. However, the very personal character of
international responsibility speaks against the transmissibility
of state responsibility. In addition, it would also violate the
principle of sovereign equality of states: another state cannot
be held liable for internationally wrongful acts committed by a
58
59
60

61).

Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶ 113.
Id. at ¶ 115.
Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Kreca, at ¶¶ 60,

See Vaclav Mikulka, State Succession and Responsibility, in THE LAW
RESPONSIBILITY 292-93 (Crawford et al. eds., 2010) (giving
examples from state practice, such as the dissolution of the Union of
Columbia in 1831 and the German assumption of liabilities arising from the
delictual responsibility of the former German Democratic Republic after the
German reunification in 1989).
62 Int’l Law Comm’n, Commentary, Commentaries to the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n on the Work of its FiftyThird Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, ¶ 3 (2001).
61

OF INTERNATIONAL
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different state. An exception can only be made where the
successor state accepts the responsibility. In the case at hand,
one could think of reinterpreting Serbia’s claim of identity with
the SFRY in an implied acquiescence to accept the
responsibility of the former state for a violation of the Genocide
Convention. The ICJ, however, did not explicitly advance this
possible legal construction.
In addition, state succession to responsibility is not be
covered by the terms of Article IX.63 The term “disputes
relating to . . . the responsibility of a State for genocide” in this
clause refers to state responsibility (i.e. a breach of an
international obligation by a state) and not to state succession
to responsibility (i.e. the legal regime governing the devolution
of rights or obligations from one state onto another). Succession
and responsibility, therefore, are distinct legal concepts. Thus,
by importing state succession to responsibility into the terms of
Article IX, the ICJ broadened its jurisdiction to include acts
that have been committed before Serbia actually became bound
by the Genocide Convention. This unsound construction given
to Article IX by the ICJ provides a retroactive construction,
thus violating the fundamental principle that a state can only
be bound to obligations to which it has consented.64 This
construction may only be deemed sound if the Court had
determined that Serbia is the legal continuator of the SFRY
rather than a successor state.
Finally, the Court must be blamed for being inconsistent.
Even if—as the ICJ suggested—state succession to
responsibility was covered by Article IX, it would have been
consequential to establish already in the admissibility stage
whether this doctrine was part of customary international law
at the time the FRY/Serbia became a party to Genocide
Convention and if so, whether FRY/Serbia had in fact
succeeded in the responsibility of the SFRY.65 The Court
63 See Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinions of Judges Sebutinde,
at ¶ 15, Xue, at ¶ 18 and Tomka, at ¶18) (referring to the drafting history of
the Genocide Convention in support of their views).
64 See Judgment, supra note 1 (Declaration of Judge Xue, at ¶ 22 (noting
that the Court had in fact applied the Convention retroactively).
65 See Judgment, supra note 1 (Declaration of Judge Xue, at ¶17) and
Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, at ¶ 21)
(criticizing the inconsistency in the Court’s reasoning); see also Judgment,
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avoided taking a clear position and shifted this problem to the
merits, where—after having found that genocide had not been
committed—it did not need to return to this issue anymore.
In conclusion, it must be stated that rules of international
law providing for the devolution of state responsibility have not
developed.66 Therefore, state responsibility to succession must
be either generally rejected or regarded as not being covered by
the terms of Article IX.
IV. The ICJ’s treatment of the merits
On the merits, the ICJ held that the acts alleged by
Croatia constituted the actus reus of genocide pursuant to
subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article II of the Convention
(killings and acts causing serious bodily injury).67 With respect
to Serbia’s counter claim, the ICJ likewise found the actus reus
of genocide according to subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article II
to be established by actions of Croatian armed forces during a
military operation in 1995.68 The Court found, however, that
the mens rea of genocide was lacking on the side of both
parties, and therefore decided that none of the acts constituted
the crime of genocide under the Genocide Convention.69
The following section discusses—without any claim to
completeness—some aspects of the Court’s judgment, which are
important for the interpretation and evolution of the law of
genocide beyond the confines of the present case.
A. Evidentiary value of ICTY cases

supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Skotnikov, at ¶ 2) (explaining that
ICJ had to “either to identify the legal mechanism by which the FRY
assumed obligations under the Genocide Convention, and thus make Article
IX applicable, before it came into existence, or to determine that no such legal
mechanism existed”).
66 See
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 424 (2013) (noting that “state succession is an area of
uncertainty and controversy . . . much of the practice is equivocal”); see also
Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, at ¶¶ 20-22)
(rejecting state succession to responsibility).
67 Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 205, 360.
68 Id. at ¶ 499.
69 See the discussion infra at IV.B.5.d.
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Like in its Bosnian Genocide Judgment of 2007,70 where
the Court for the first time found a violation of the Genocide
Convention, the ICJ in the present case again referred
significantly to proceedings before the ICTY—both to
determine the facts and with regard to legal conclusions.71 This
practice of the ICJ raises the question of the relationship
between the ICJ and International Criminal Tribunals, such as
the ICTY.
The ICJ first recalled that the law of genocide—as an
international crime of individuals on the one hand and as an
international wrongful act of a state on the other hand—is
governed by different legal regimes, which in general pursue
different aims. Despite these differences, the ICJ noted that it
would nevertheless take into account decisions of international
criminal courts and tribunals in examining whether genocide
has been committed.72
References to statements and decisions of other
international bodies in principle should be welcomed because
they contribute to legal coherence and uniformity. Moreover,
judicial decisions are explicitly assigned a subsidiary means for
determining international law.73 Nevertheless, the ICJ should
take a different position when it comes to references to
international criminal bodies, like the ICTY. The ICJ should
distinguish between references to findings of fact and
references to legal determinations made by the ICTY.
The ICTY’s findings of fact are valuable for the
proceedings before the ICJ und should be welcomed. The
ICTY’s mandate is to adjudicate on individual criminal
responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia.74 As a
Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 223.
See e.g., Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 220-294, 308, 376, 393, 473
(referring to ICTY cases regarding the determination of facts), ¶ 157
(referring to the ICTY’s interpretation of “serious harm” in the definition of
genocide) and ¶ 158 (referring the ICTY’s view that rape may amount to the
actus reus of genocide).
72 Id. ¶¶ 128-29.
73 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), supra
note 30 (listing judicial decisions as a supplementary source of international
law).
74 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
70
71
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more specialized institution, it is in general better equipped to
investigate the factual circumstances.
With regard to legal determinations, in particular the
interpretation of the elements of genocide, however, the ICJ
should be extremely cautious to refer to the decisions of
international criminal bodies.75 Relying on legal evaluations in
the context of international criminal law is problematic
because of the structural and substantial differences between
state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility for
genocide, especially when it comes to determining genocidal
intent. While criminal tribunals adjudicate on the criminal
responsibility of individual persons, the ICJ—when assessing
genocide—is concerned with the cumulative impact of different
acts committed in a wide area by a large number of
perpetrators, who may not even be individually identifiable.
Therefore, the ICJ should not take over legal determinations on
genocide by International Criminal Tribunals without
reflection.
Even more caution should be applied with respect to
assigning relevance to decisions of the ICTY Prosecutor
whether or not to include a charge of genocide in an
indictment. In this regard, the ICJ referred to a passage in its
2007 Bosnia Judgment, where the Court had stated that “as a
general proposition the inclusion of charges in an indictment
cannot be given weight. What may however be significant is
the decision of the Prosecutor . . . not to include or to exclude a
charge of genocide.”76 The ICJ fails to explain why the
Prosecutor’s decision not to charge for genocide may be
significant, while the Prosecutor’s decision to charge for
genocide may not.
Instead of making this distinction, prosecutorial
decisions—irrespective of their contents—should not be
assigned legal value for proceedings before the ICJ at all. An
international criminal Prosecutor is assigned wide discretion as
Yugoslavia, art. 1, supra note 25.
75 But see Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Skotnikov,
¶14) (arguing that the ICJ is not competent to decide on genocidal intent and
stating that the ICJ instead should have better taken notice of the relevant
proceedings of the ICTY).
76 Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 217.
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to whether or not to bring a charge and, moreover, he does not
need to give reasons for his decision.77 It should also be
considered that the Prosecutor’s decision is not merely based on
legal, but on a variety of pragmatic considerations, such as the
cost and length of the proceeding and the availability of
witnesses.78 Prosecutorial decisions are, therefore, not judicial
decisions, and consequently are not a supplementary source of
law according to Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute.79 An
international Prosecutor has a dual function, acting both as an
objective ‘administrator of justice’ in the interest of
international justice when identifying, investigating and
prosecuting an international crime, and as a subjective party in
an adversarial trial.80
In the present judgment, it remains unclear how much
evidential weight the ICJ places on the decisions of the ICTY
Prosecutor, because some statements of the ICJ remain
ambiguous. For instance, while in one passage the Court, after
having found that genocidal intent is lacking, noted that “the
ICTY prosecutor has never charged any individual on account
of genocide,”81 the Court stated in another passage that it “did
not intend to turn the absence of charges into decisive proof
that there had not been genocide, but took the view that this
factor may be of significance and would be taken into
consideration”.82
Similarly nebulous are passages in which the ICJ seems to
make a distinction regarding the rank and hierarchy of persons
77 See
generally Jingbo Dong, Prosecutorial Discretion at the
International Criminal Court: A Comparative Study, 2 J. POL. & L 109, 112
(2009) (studying the role of the Prosecutor at the ICC arguing that his
decision to bring a charge is not governed by the rule of law, but is under his
discretion).
78 See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-21-A, Judgment, Appeals
Chamber (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), ¶ 602
(stating that “the entity responsible for prosecutions has finite human and
financial resources and cannot realistically be expected to prosecute every
offender”).
79 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 30, at art.
38(1)(d).
80 Sergey Vasiliev, Trial, in International Prosecutors 728 (Luc Reydams,
Jan Wouters, Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2012) (commenting on the operational
function of a prosecutor).
81 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 440.
82 Id. ¶ 187.
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in the chain of command against whom a charge of genocide is
brought. The ICJ stated “the fact that charges of genocide were
not included in any of the indictments is of greater significance
than would have been the case had the defendants occupied
much lower positions in the chain of command.”83 The ICJ is to
blame for not further elucidating this issue and setting clearer
standards for future cases.
B. Elements of genocide
According to the definition in Article II of the Genocide
Convention, the crime of genocide has two requirements:, first,
that a state commits one of the prohibited acts listed in
subparagraphs a-e (actus reus) and second, that the state has a
specific intent when conducting these acts, i.e. the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group (mens rea).84 As the ICJ has stressed, these two
elements are intertwined in that “the determination of actus
reus can require an inquiry into intent . . . [and] the
characterization of the acts and their mutual relationship can
contribute to an inference of intent.”85
The following analysis focuses on select issues relating to
genocide in the ICJ’s judgment, which are the question of the
protected groups, the acts necessary for constituting genocide,
and the existence and proof of the required special intent to
commit genocide. These issues are also the most controversial
ones discussed by international doctrine and jurisprudence
concerning genocide. Therefore, the Court’s view can help to
clarify and shed light on certain disputed aspects of the law of
genocide.
1. Protected “group”
Both the prohibited acts of subparagraphs (a)-(e) and the
specific intent refer to a particular object of genocide, which is a
national, racial, ethnical or religious group. Legal controversies
concern the question of whether the list of protected groups is
Id.
Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. II.
85 Id. ¶ 130.
83
84
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exhaustive or merely illustrative. This issue especially
concerns the protection of political or social groups, which are
not explicitly mentioned in Article II. The wording and the
travaux préparatoires of this provision suggest an exhaustive
list.86
Another controversial point is how exactly the terms
defining the targeted groups should be defined, since the four
groups contemplated by Article II elude precise definition.
Should they be construed objectively, from the perception of
third-party observers, or subjectively, from the perspective of
the persons involved? If they are to be construed subjectively,
whose perspective is relevant? The perspective of the
perpetrators or the self-perception of the targeted group?87
Moreover, should these groups be defined positively, by the
existence of certain common characteristics, or negatively, by
the absence of certain features?88
In the 2007 Bosnia Judgment, the ICJ had rejected a
negative construction and, though not unequivocally, indicated
that it would also reject a purely subjective determination,
opting for the inclusion of objective criteria.89
If a perpetrator kills many people believing they constitute
86 See Lars Berster, art. II, in CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE; A COMMENTARY 102 (Christian
Tams et al. eds. 2014) (pointing out the limitations under the Genocide
Convention); see also Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide:
Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2261
(1997) (arguing that that Genocide Convention limits the protected classes to
those listed in art. 2); but see The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-964-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998), ¶ 616 (suggesting that other
groups than those expressly mentioned may be protected because the drafters
of the Genocide Convention focused not so much on the listed types of groups
as on trying to find terms to depict groups of a stable and permanent
character).
87 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda Trial Chamber, Dec. 6, 1999) ¶ 56 (employing a subjective definition
of a group); Claus Kress, The Crime of Genocide Under International Law, 6
INT’L CRIMINAL L. REV 461, 477 (2006) (opting for an objective definition of a
group).
88 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 14, 1999), ¶ 70 (employing a negative definition);
but see Prosecutor v Stakic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, IT-97-24-A (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 22, 2006) ¶ 20 (rejecting a
negative construction).
89 Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶¶ 193-96.
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a protected group, when in fact they are not, this does not
constitute genocide under the objective definition.90 Instead, it
constitutes genocide under the subjective approach.91 The
disadvantage of the subjective approach, however, is that it
leaves it up to the perpetrator himself to define the crime,
making the commission of genocide hardly foreseeable and
determinable for others.92 Therefore, a differentiated, combined
approach is preferable: an objective criterion to determine
whether a group constitutes a protected group under the
Genocide Convention, and a subjective approach in order to
determine whether a specific individual belongs to the
protected group.
In the present Judgment, the ICJ missed the opportunity
to further clarify its view on this issue, probably because this
point had not been explicitly contested by Serbia. Instead of
elaborating more on this point, the ICJ simply determined the
protected group to be Croat national or ethnical group on the
territory of Croatia.93
2. Meaning of subparagraph (b) “Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group”
The ICJ had to decide whether the actus reus of genocide
in the form of “causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group” under subparagraph (b) was
established. Legal controversy concerns the meaning of
“serious”. This term indicates that the bodily or mental harm
has to meet a certain threshold, but views on the specific
degree differ in legal scholarship.94
In the present judgment, the ICJ opted for a narrow
interpretation by setting the standard high. According to the
Court “serious” not only refers to the immediate negative
90 L. J. VAN DEN HERIK, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RWANDA
TRIBUNAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 134
(Koninklijke Brill NV 2005).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 134-35.
93 See Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 205 (finding that the Croat national
group is protected under the Genocide Convention).
94 See Berster, supra note 86, at 118 (providing further references for the
definition of “serious”).
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mental or physical effect on individual group members, but also
requires that the harm must be of such nature as to contribute
to the destruction of the targeted group as such.95 The Court
pointed out that ICTY uses a similar interpretation of “serious
harm”.96
In fact, a narrow interpretation finds some support in the
travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention.97 It is also
the view taken by the International Law Commission.98
According to this interpretation, for example, bodily or mental
torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, rape, sexual
violence, and persecution would constitute the act of genocide
since these acts include serious physical and/or mental injuries
to individual group members and also may have a detrimental
effect on the group as a whole.99
However, such a narrow interpretation is not strictly
required by the term’s literal meaning, its object and purpose
or from a contextual interpretation. Nothing in Article II
suggests that the acts listed in subparagraphs (a)-(e) are to be
construed to require a concrete aptitude to contribute to the
destruction of the group.100 In addition, such a narrow
interpretation is not necessary in light of the Convention’s
object and purpose, since the issue of using ineligible means to
affect the group as such can be duly addressed when
establishing the genocidal intent.101 Rather, the meaning of
Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 157.
Id. ¶ 157 (referring to Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, IT-00-39-T (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Sept. 27, 2006), ¶ 862 and
Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Dec. 12, 2012) ¶ 738).
97 See Berster, supra note 86, at 118 (discussing the drafting history of
the Genocide Convention).
98 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of
Mankind with commentaries, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996).
99 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Chamber (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 6, 1999), ¶ 51 (accepting genocide for
acts constituting acts of bodily or mental torture, inhumane or degrading
treatment, rape, sexual violence, and persecution).
100 See Berster, supra note 86, at 119 (arguing e contrario with regard to
the term “calculated to” in subparagraph (c), which stipulates that the
conditions imposed upon the group have to be capable of causing its
destruction).
101 Id. at 119.
95
96
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“serious bodily harm” and “serious mental harm” should be
determined on a case-by-case basis, using a common sense
approach. Excluded should only be minor or temporary
impairment of physical or mental faculties.
A narrow interpretation, however, may be appropriate to
restrict a too extensive application of the Genocide Convention
in cases where the acts are not immediately directed against
the group members but against third persons. In the case,
Croatia had argued to include the psychological suffering of
relatives of individuals who disappeared in the context of an
alleged genocide. The ICJ did not accept this argument as such,
but considered that the persistent refusal of the competent
authorities to provide these relatives with information, which
would enable them to establish whether those individuals are
dead and how they died, may only fall within the scope of this
provision, if the harm resulting from that suffering contributes
to the physical or biological destruction of the group.102 For
example, in a case concerning mass executions in Srebrenica,
the ICTY Trial Chamber found that, witnessing executions of
relatives and friends, the victims suffered the further mental
anguish of helplessness by lying still and listening for long
hours to the moans of those executed.103
3. Meaning of subparagraph (c) “Deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction”
Acts falling under subparagraph (c), “deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction”, have been described as “measures of slow
death”.104 International legal scholarship generally construes
the term “calculated” as including an objective element, in
addition to the subjective element of intent.105 The exact scope
of this objective content, however, is a matter of legal
controversy—with some scholars construing this term to mean

Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 160.
Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, IT-02-60-T, Trial Chamber (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 17, 2005), ¶¶ 647-49.
104 Berster, Convention on Genocide Commentary, supra note 86, at 121.
105 See id. at 122 (providing further references).
102
103
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that the measure used must be the principle mechanism of
destruction, while for others a certain capability, possibility or
probability of bringing about the destruction of the group is
sufficient.106
In the present judgment, the ICJ did not endorse a
position. Nevertheless, the Court seemed to favor an
interpretation in the sense that the measure inflicted must
entail some probability with regard to the full or partial
destruction of the group. This can be inferred from the ICJ’s
rejection of Croatia’s claim that rape, deprivation of food and
medical care, looting of property and forced labor of Croats
constituted the actus reus of subparagraph (c). The ICJ held
these measures to be on a scale below the threshold of inflicting
conditions of life on the group capable of bringing about its
physical destruction.107
The ICJ must be welcomed for employing the probability
test. It is a common standard in criminal law to make a certain
criminal conduct objectively quantifiable. Probability is a
matter of common knowledge because one who does the act,
knowing the present state of things, is guilty irrespectively of
whether it can be proven that he has subjectively foreseen the
all the consequences.
The ICJ took great care in establishing whether other acts
alleged by Croatia qualified as “deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction”.” In this regard, the ICJ, e.g., concluded that
forcing Croats to wear specific signs to stigmatize the group’s
members was not aimed at the immediate physical destruction
of this group. This conducted is rather, as the Court noted, only
a preliminary step towards the perpetration of the actus reus of
genocide, because this measure helps to identify the group.
Nevertheless, the ICJ announced that this measure can be
taken into account for establishing the mens rea of genocide,
the existence of genocidal intent.108
The ICJ also confirmed its position taken in the 2007
Bosnia Judgment with regard to ethnic cleansing or forced

106
107
108

Id. at 123.
Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 364-72, 385, 393.
Id. ¶ 382.
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displacement In the Bosnia Judgment, the ICJ had defined
ethnic cleansing as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous
by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given
groups from the area”.”109 When drafting the Genocide
Convention the states did not consider ethnic cleansing or
forced displacement as a stand-alone act of genocide. However,
they were of the view that at least some aspects of the forcible
expulsion of a protected group should be included in
subparagraph (c) of Article II (“deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction”).110
Discussing whether the alleged forced displacement or
ethnic cleansing of Croats in the case under analysis should be
characterized as the actus reus under this subparagraph, the
ICJ cited its Bosnia Judgment, where it had explained that
[n]either the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area
‘ethnically homogeneous’, nor the operations that may be carried
out to implement such policy, can as such be designated as
genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is ‘to destroy, in
whole or in part’ a particular group, and deportation or
displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force,
is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is
such
destruction
an
automatic
consequence
of
the
displacement . . . In other words, whether a particular operation
described as ‘ethnic cleansing’ amounts to genocide depends on
the presence or absence of acts listed in Article II of the Genocide
Convention, and of the intent to destroy the group as such. 111

The ICJ stressed that the circumstances, in which the
forced displacements were carried out, are critical.112
Regarding Croatia’s allegations in this case, the Court found
that the restrictions on the movement of the Croats contributed
to a climate of coercion and terror. They were aimed at forcing
those persons to leave the territories controlled by Serb forces.
The Court also acknowledged that restrictions on freedom of
Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 190.
See Berster, Convention on Genocide Commentary, supra note 86, at
132 (explaining that Syria’s proposal that the Convention should contain an
expansive conception of genocide which includes forced mass exodus was
rejected by the other state parties).
111 Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 190.
112 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶163.
109
110
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movement may undermine the social bond between members of
the group, and hence lead to the destruction of the group’s
cultural identity. The Court, however, found no evidence to
conclude that these measures were carried out in
circumstances calculated to result in the total or partial
physical destruction of the group.113
The ICJ’s restrictive and cautious approach is to be
welcomed. This is because restrictions on the free movement of
persons or groups of persons can pursue different (either
legitimate or illegitimate) aims, for example security or
economic reasons according to a specific government policy.
One example is ’Israel’s relocation policy in the occupied
Palestinian territories. These restrictions are not per se
indicative of an actus reus of genocide.
However, such measures may serve as an early warning
sign. This was correctly noted by the ICJ when adding that,
nonetheless, measures of forced displacement occurring in
parallel acts falling under Article II may be “indicative of the
presence of a specific intent (dolus specialis) inspiring those
acts”.114 In this regard, the relocation policy of Nazi-Germany
concerning Jews during World War II serves an example of a
measure indicating genocidal intent.
4. Meaning of subparagraph (d) “Measures intended to
prevent births within the group”
With respect to subparagraph (d) “Measures intended to
prevent births within the group” the ICJ commented on the
disputed issue whether this provision includes rape. According
to the Court’s view, rape under certain conditions may fall
within the scope of this provision. The Court referred to the
ICTR’s decision in Akayesu. There, the ICTR had stated that
the mental effects of rape could lead members of the group not
to procreate and that rape therefore, especially in patriarchal
societies where membership of a group is determined by the
identity of the father, could be “an example of a measure
intended to prevent births within a group”115
113
114
115

Id. ¶ 380.
Id. ¶ 434.
ICTR-96-4-T ¶¶ 507-08.
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In the case at hand, the ICJ did not have enough elements
to evaluate this issue because Croatia could not provide
sufficient evidence that rape was committed specifically with
the intention to prevent births within the group.116
5. Genocidal intent
The subjective side of genocide or the mens rea, requires
the existence of two separate mental elements. First, the
perpetrator’s mens rea concerning the fulfillment of all the
objective criteria of the prohibited acts of genocide listed in the
subparagraphs of Article II. Second, the specific intent (dolus
specialis) to “destroy” the targeted group, in whole or in part.
As the ICJ rightly emphasized, it is the second mental
element, the specific genocidal intent, the intent to “destroy”,
that contributes to the elevated wrongfulness of genocide,
making this crime distinguishable from other international
crimes.117
The determination of the specific mental element of
genocide is difficult. There are huge practical difficulties in
determining the existence of such intent, because it is
impossible to peek into the minds of the perpetrators. In cases
before the ICJ dealing with international wrongful acts of
states, rather than persons, another aspect, in addition, comes
into play: Usually, international courts when deciding on state
responsivity are only concerned with objective criteria: to
determine whether a norm of international law has been
violated and whether the violation is attributable to a state.
The existence of a specific subjective or mental state of the
state is not relevant for establishing state responsibility;
subjective elements are alien elements when it comes to
international wrongful act of states and state responsibility.
Instead, they are typical elements in establishing international
criminal responsibility of individual persons in the area of
international criminal law. Genocide is the only exception,
because it requires the existence of a mental element, even
with regard to state conduct. It follows from this exceptional
character of genocide, that the ICJ, as a body adjudicating on
116
117

Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 397.
Id. ¶ 132.
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violations of international obligations by states, unlike
International Criminal Tribunals, is generally not so
experienced with handling a mens rea element.
a) The intent to “destroy” (a group in whole or in part)
International doctrine generally employs two different
approaches to establish genocidal intent, which are known as
the knowledge-based approach and the purpose-based
approach. These two approaches differ in that they either
stress the cognitive element (knowledge-based approach) or
emphasize the volitional element concerning the special
purpose, in the genocidal intent (purpose-based approach).118
For example, under the knowledge-based approach, a
perpetrator acts with the mens rea of genocide when he
willingly commits a prohibited act with the knowledge that his
action would bring about the destruction of a protected group,
or alternatively, with the knowledge that his conduct would
contribute to other acts being committed against the group,
which when put together, would bring about the destruction of
that group, in whole or in part.119 Therefore, for the second
alternative, a plan or state policy, or positive knowledge of the
context in which genocide occurs would be necessary.
Under the purpose-based approach, the perpetrator must
consciously desire his prohibited act to result in the destruction
of the group in whole or in part and he must know that his acts
will likely cause such an effect.
The ICJ, like in its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, though not
expressly stating it, followed the purpose-based approach by
requiring that the destruction of the group was the primary
goal or purpose of the conduct.120 This approach best fits the
See e.g. Berster, Convention on Genocide Commentary, supra note 86,
at 136; Kress, Elements of Genocide, supra note 28, at 625 (explaining the
different approaches to genocidal intent in legal scholarship).
119
See Katherine Goldsmith, The Issue of Intent in the Genocide
Convention and Its Effect on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide: Toward a Knowledge-Based Approach Genocide Studies and
Prevention, 5 Genocide Studies and Prevention 245 (2010) (naming as an
example from English law a situation where a person obtains a gun, willingly
aims it at someone, and pulls the trigger).
120 See Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 134-136; Bosnia Judgment, supra
note 28, ¶ 188 (employing the purposed-based approach to determine
118
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language in the definition of genocide in Article II of the
Genocide Convention. Moreover, the attribution of intent to a
perpetrator who, under the knowledge-based approach, only
foresaw the destruction of the group is a too low standard. A
low standard is not justifiable given the incredibly significant
stigma that is attached to the crime of genocide. Therefore, a
high standard of intent and, consequently, a high burden of
proof must apply in genocide cases.
The ICJ then elaborated on the question whether the term
“destroy” only includes the physical or biological destruction, or
whether it also encompasses the destruction of the targeted
group as a social entity.121 Lemkin, the author of the term
genocide, considered the intent to destroy in a broad way. In
his view, genocide starts with the perpetrator’s intent to
destroy the group’s economic life or its cultural and social
characteristics, culminating in its physical destruction as the
ultimate stage.122 The German Constitutional Court in the
Jorgic Case also favors a broad interpretation of the term
“destroy” in the sense to include the social or cultural
destruction of a group.123 The European Court of Human
Rights upheld this interpretation and argued that the broad
interpretation of intent to destroy does not appear
unreasonable when read within the systematic context of the
prohibited conduct, which includes measures intended to
prevent births in a group and the forcible transfer of children of
the group to another group.124
The ICJ has taken a different approach and, by doing so,
has aligned itself in the jurisprudence of International
Criminal Tribunals.125 In the present judgment, the ICJ
genocidal intent).
121 See generally Kress, Elements of Genocide, supra note 28, at 625
(commenting on the definition of “destroy”); see also Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT98-33-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Aug. 2,
2001) at ¶ 580 (rejecting a social conception as a proper definition for the
term “destroy”).
122 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 7, at 87-89.
123 See In Re Jorgic, 2 BvR 1290/99 (Federal Constitutional Court,
Germany, Dec. 12, 2000) at ¶ III(4)(a)(aa) (interpreting Article 220a of the
German Criminal Code).
124 Jorgic v. Germany, No. 74613/01 (E.Ct.H.R., July 12, 2007) ¶¶ 103113.
125 See The Prosecutor v Krstic, IT-98-33-T, supra note 121, ¶¶ 576-580
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followed the reasoning in its 2007 Bosnia Judgment by
rejecting a broad interpretation of “destroy”.126 The Court
concluded that the specific intent is to be interpreted narrowly,
requiring that the perpetrator must have intended the physical
or biological destruction of the protected group.127
In fact, the drafting history of the Genocide Convention
supports the ICJ’s view, by suggesting a narrow interpretation
of the term destruction, which encompasses only the physical
or biological destruction.128 Such a narrow interpretation is also
supported by a systematic interpretation of Article II of
Genocide Convention, since all prohibited acts listed in
subparagraphs a-e refer to a conduct, which results in a
physical destruction. Thus, interpreting the term destroy
otherwise would disconnect the umbrella clause from the
prohibited modalities of the commission of genocide.129
The Genocide Convention expressly envisages situations
where a group may be targeted for destruction “in part”.” In the
present case, the ICJ had to take position on the question of
how large the targeted “part” must be to meet the threshold for
genocidal intent.
The Genocide Convention and its travaux préparatoires
remain silent on this issue. It is argued that, in light of the
protective purpose of the Genocide Convention, only such
fractions, whose destruction would affect the entire group’s
existence, may qualify.130
The ICJ cited from its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, in which it
had determined that the term “in part” must be understood as
“substantial part”.”131 According to the ICJ, the substantiality
criterion must be assessed by reference to a number of factors,
such as the geographical location of the targeted group, the
(opting for a narrow interpretation of intent).
126 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 134-136; Bosnia Judgment, supra note
28, ¶ 190.
127 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 36.
128 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission
on the work of its forty-eighth session, UN Doc. A/51/10 (6 May 1996-26 July
1996), at 90-91 (displaying the drafting history of the Genocide Convention).
129 Kress, Elements of Genocide, supra note 28, at 627.
130 Berster, Convention on Genocide Commentary, supra note 86, at 14849.
131 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 142.
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area of the perpetrator’s activity and control, and the
prominence of the targeted part within the group as a whole.132
Regarding the latter factor, the ICJ referred to the ICTY’s
Krstic decision, in which the tribunal noted that
“[i]f a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall
group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding
that the part qualifies as substantial.”133The ICJ, using a
slightly modified language than in its 2007 Judgment,
transformed these factors for the first time into a tripartite test
to determine whether the substantiality requirement is met.
The Court explained, “[i]n evaluating whether the allegedly
targeted part of a protected group is substantial in relation to
the overall group, the Court will take into account the
quantitative element as well as evidence regarding the
geographic location and prominence of the allegedly targeted
part of the group.”134This test applied to the case under
consideration, the ICJ first delineated the Croats living in
specific
regions
(Eastern
and
Western
Slavonia,
Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia) as the relevant
part of the targeted group.135 Then, the ICJ went on to assess
whether this identified part was substantial. The Court found
that “the ethnic Croat population living in the [identified]
regions . . . numbered between 1.7 and 1.8 million
[individuals . . . and] constituted slightly less than half of the
ethnic population living in Croatia.”136 The ICJ further stated
“that acts committed by JNA and Serb forces in the [identified]
regions . . . targeted the Croats living in those regions, within
which these armed forces exercised and sought to expand their
control.”137 With respect to the criteria of the prominence of the
group, the Court found that Croatia had not provided any
information on this point.138 This, however, did not preclude
the Court from generally finding that “the Croats living in the
Id.
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber Apr. 19, 2004) (referred to
by the ICJ in the Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 200).
134 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 142.
135 Id. ¶ 403.
136 Id. ¶ 406.
137 Id.
138 Id.
132
133
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identified regions formed a substantial part of the ethnic Croat
group living within the territory of Croatia during the relevant
period.”139
A closer look at the Court’s reasoning reveals that the
Court has not only reaffirmed the substantiality criterion
enunciated in its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, but, has also
systematized the different factors of this criterion by setting
out a formula for a tripartite test to assess whether the
substantiality threshold is met. Despite the slightly different
language employed, the ICJ has not departed from its 2007
test, but only renamed and restructured it. The test
pronounced by the Court in the present Judgment suggests
that the three criteria for the substantiality test (quantitative
element, geographic location and prominence) are to be applied
in an egalitarian manner. There is no normative order between
these factors.
With this adapted substantiality test, the ICJ has aligned
itself with the jurisprudence of International Criminal
Tribunals as well as the majority view among legal
commentators.140 Nevertheless, it must be criticized that,
beyond this welcome clarification of the standard applied in its
prior Judgment, the criteria set out in the tripartite test
remain vague. In conclusion, the ICJ again has missed out the
opportunity to set out further parameters that would provide
guidance to future cases.
b) Proof of genocidal intent
To prove genocidal intent is an extremely difficult task. In
contrast to the determination of physical acts, which are visible
and therefore can be proven by reference to a number of
objective criteria, looking inside the mind of a perpetrator is
impossible. In fact, many perpetrators cannot be held
responsible for committing genocide because of the high
threshold that applies to genocidal intent. The Armenian
Genocide of the early 20th century is a good example where,
Id.
See e.g. Prosecutor v. Krstic, supra note 121, ¶ 12; Prosecutor v.
Tolimir, supra note 96, ¶ 749; Berster, supra note 86, at 149 (arguing in favor
of the substantiality test).
139
140
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despite
the
international
community’s
overwhelming
condemnation of the events as genocide, Turkey, the legal
continuator of the then-existing Ottoman Empire, still denies
that it had acted with genocidal intent.141
Especially when it comes to determining genocidal intent
of a state, difficulties arise because the state is an abstract
entity which, unlike individual persons, per se does not possess
a particular state of mind. Therefore, in order to hold the state
internationally responsible for genocide, it is crucial to
attribute the actions of individual perpetrators to the state.
When it comes to establishing genocidal intent of the state, the
question, therefore, is whether the intent of an individual
acting alone or in a group is sufficient, or if the presence of a
particular state policy is required. In this regard, it must be
recalled again that the nature of individual criminal
responsibility is fundamentally different than that of state
responsibility for genocide. Consequently, different standards
to prove genocidal intent may apply.142
In the case under consideration, the ICJ faced the difficult
task of establishing whether Serbia and Croatia had acted with
the necessary mens rea. The ICJ began its analysis with an
extensive discussion on the standard and burden of proof of
genocidal intent. The Court first recalled the general
procedural rule that the party alleging a fact also bears the
burden of proof for that fact.143 Regarding the standard of
proof, the ICJ referred to its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, where it
had held that “claims against a State involving charges of

Cf. John Kifner, Armenian Genocide of 1915: An Overview, N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics_armeniangenocide.html
(explaining the events that led to the Armenian Genocide).
142 Compare Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, ¶ 48
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Appeal Chamber July 5, 2001)
(stating that “[t]he existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the
crime, although it may facilitate proof of the crime”) with Kress, supra note
67, at 461 (arguing that genocide as a state act requires the existence of a
state policy, or at least a collective destructive act). See also the International
Criminal Court (ICC) Elements of Crimes for Article 6 of the ICC Statute
(departing from the case law of International Criminal Tribunals in requiring
proof that genocide occurred “in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group”).
143 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 172.
141

39

3 INES GILLICH (DO NOT DELETE)

156

PACE INT’L L. REV.

8/10/2016 9:51 AM

[Vol. 28:1

exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully
conclusive . . . the same standard applies to the proof of
attribution for such acts.”144The ICJ also clarified a passage
from its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, where it had noted that
inference of genocidal intent must be “the only possible
inference.” This formulation had caused some confusion among
scholars, because it slightly differed from the statement made
by the ICTY that “such a finding must be the only reasonable
conclusion available from the evidence.”145 The ICJ now took
the chance to explain that the ICTY’s criterion is in substance
identical with that laid down by the Court in its 2007
judgment.146
Evaluating the Court’s statement, it must be noted that
such a high standard of proof for genocidal intent goes beyond
the usual test applied by the ICJ in regular cases of
international responsibility of states. In fact, such a high
standard resembles only standards of proof for guilt in criminal
proceedings. On the one hand, applying such a high standard
makes it particular difficult to prove genocide. On the other
hand, a strict test is justified because of the special character
and stigma that is attached to genocide as the “crime of
crimes.”
c) The ICJ’s assessment of the evidence
The ICJ first noted that it could not find an explicit state
policy to commit genocide by the Croatian or Serbian
government. Therefore, the ICJ found it necessary to establish
whether a pattern of conduct existed, from which genocidal
intent—as the only reasonable inference—could be drawn.147 In
order to prove the existence of such a pattern of conduct by
Serbia, Croatia had advanced a number of factors.148 The ICJ
144

209.

Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 178; Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶

Prosecutor v. Tolimir, supra note 96, ¶ 34.
Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 148.
147 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 148 (referring to the Bosnia Judgment,
supra note 28, at ¶ 373).
148 Id. at ¶ 408 (determining the factors advanced by Serbia as: The
political doctrine of Serbian expansionism (1), statements of public officials
and propaganda of state controlled media (2), that the pattern of attacks far
145
146

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/3
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examined only those factors that
[C]oncern the scale and allegedly systematic nature of the
attacks, the fact that those attacks are said to have caused
casualties and damage far in excess of what was justified by
military necessity, the specific targeting of Croats and the
nature, extent and degree of the injuries caused to the Croat
population.149

According to ICJ these factors implied a pattern of widespread
attacks, conducted according to a similar modus operandi, by
Serb forces on localities with Croat populations. But the Court
determined that intent to destroy the group, either totally or
partially, was not the only reasonable inference that could be
drawn from this pattern of conduct.150 Similarly, the ICJ did
not find genocidal intent on the part of Croatia when assessing
Serbia’s counter-claim.151
exceeded any legitimate military objective (3), contemporaneous video footage
(4), the explicit recognition by the JNA that paramilitary groups were
engaging in genocidal acts (5), the close co-operation between the JNA and
the Serb paramilitary groups implying close planning and logistical support
(6), the systematic nature and scale of the attacks on Croats (7), that ethnic
Croats were constantly singled out for attack while local Serbs were excluded
(8), that ethnic Croats were required to identify themselves and their
property by special marks (9), the number of Croats killed and missing as a
proportion of the local population (10), the nature, degree and extent of the
injuries inflicted (through physical attacks, acts of torture, inhuman and
degrading treatment, rape and sexual violence), “including injuries with
recognizable ethnic characteristics” (11), the use of ethnically derogatory
language in the course of killing, torture and rape (12); the forced
displacement of Croats and the organized means adopted to this end (13); the
systematic looting and destruction of Croat cultural and religious
monuments(14); the suppression of Croat culture and religious practices (15);
the consequent permanent and evidently intended demographic changes to
the regions concerned(16); the failure to punish the crimes (17)).
149 Id. ¶ 413.
150 Id. ¶¶ 416, 424-26 (finding that the aims of the Serb forces included,
i.e. a political objective to unite Serb areas in Croatia in order to establish a
unified territory and creating an ethnically homogeneous Serb State) and ¶
430 (finding that the intent of the perpetrators was not to physically destroy
the members of the protected group, as such, but to punish them because of
their status as enemies in a military sense.)
151 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 500 (rejecting Serbia’s argument that
genocidal intent can be inferred from the actual language of the transcript of
the meeting held at Brioni on 31 July, 1995 and, in any event, from the
pattern of conduct that is apparent from the totality of the actions decided
upon and implemented by the Croatian authorities during and immediately
after Operation “Storm.”)
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Evaluating the Court’s reasoning, it has to be concluded
that the Court’s rejection of genocidal intent of Croatia and
Serbia is consequential, considering the high threshold which
applies. Nevertheless, the Court did not make it really clear
why it only focused on only some of the factors advanced by
Croatia to establish genocidal intent. The arguments of the
Court on this point remain superficial.152
6.

Relevance of the Law of War

A final observation need to be made regarding the relevance of
International Humanitarian Law, or the Law of War, in the
present judgment. The ICJ briefly addressed the issue of
whether acts committed during an armed conflict must, in
order to constitute the actus reus of genocide, be unlawful
under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This issue was
under dispute between Croatia and Serbia because Serbia had
argued that acts committed by Serb forces occurred during a
“legitimate combat” with Croatian armed forces.153 The ICJ
noted that it does not “rule, in general or in abstract terms, on
the relationship between the Genocide Convention and
international humanitarian law”.”154 The ICJ acknowledged
that, while the Genocide Convention and IHL are two distinct
bodies of rules, pursuing different aims, IHL might
nevertheless be relevant in order to decide whether the alleged
acts constitute genocide within the meaning of the Genocide
Convention.155 Accordingly, the ICJ made in different places
throughout the judgment some remarks on the illegality under
IHL of certain acts, which it considered relevant for the
determination of the actus reus and mens rea of genocide. For
example, with regard to the actus reus of genocide, the ICJ
referred to the ICTY Mrkšić case. In that case the Tribunal had
determined that a military operation against Croat forces had
been carried out in an indiscriminate way, directed deliberately
against the civilian population, in contrast to IHL.156 With

152
153
154
155
156

For a possible explanation, see concluding remarks.
Id. ¶ 152.
Id. ¶ 153.
Id.
Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 472.
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regard to subparagraph (b), the ICJ again referred to the ICTY,
which had found that certain Croat Prisoners of War had been
subject to ill treatment and torture, perpetrated by Serb
forces.157 Also, IHL seemed to be relevant to the ICJ for
establishing the mens rea of genocide. In this regard, the ICJ
explained its special consideration of only some of the factors
advanced by Croatia to proof genocidal intent with the fact
“that those attacks are said to have caused casualties and
damage far in excess of what was justified by military
necessity”.158 The ICJ seemed to regard the illegality of a
conduct under IHL, especially a violation of the principle of
military necessity or proportionality, as an indicator for
genocidal intent. Concerning Serbia’s counter-claim, the ICJ
also referred to IHL when noting that the legality of the
shelling of Serbian villages by Croat forces during a military
operation indicated that the mental element of genocide was
lacking.159
In international scholarship the relationship between the
law of genocide and IHL has not been satisfyingly settled.
Insofar, the ICJ’s statements in this Judgment provide an
interesting contribution to the discussion.
V. Concluding remarks
With its Judgment in Croatia v. Serbia of 2015 the ICJ—at
least in a juridical senje—closed a 15-year old violent chapter
of the post-Yugoslav history. One of the lasting (political and
historical) contributions of the judgment is to set a record for
history of the horrible events that have happened. In addition
to its political significance, the ICJ’s ruling has also made an
important legal contribution to the international law of
genocide. By largely following the path set out in the ICJ’s
2007 Bosnia judgment, the present judgment contributed to a
coherent legal approach the interpretation of the main
elements of genocide, even though it must be citizen that the
Court sometimes remains too vague with respect to disputed
aspects of this crime. One of the major themes throughout the
157
158
159

Id. ¶ 308.
Id. ¶ 413.
Id. ¶¶ 474-75.
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entire judgment is the Court’s general restrictive approach
regarding the interpretation of the actus reus and mens rea of
genocide by which the Court has set a high threshold for
allegations of genocide in future cases. Strongly criticized must
be the ICJ’s treatment of the jurisdictional problem concerning
alleged acts that took place before Serbia became bound by the
Genocide Convention in its own right. Notwithstanding these
problematical aspects, the ICJ’s recent decision on the
Genocide Convention, overall, is to be welcomed. The legal
impact of this judgment reaches beyond the dispute between
Serbia and Croatia in the present case. This is not only because
decisions of the ICJ are an authoritative statement of the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, but also because
judicial decision in general serve as a supplementary means of
interpretation for international law. The ICJ’s contribution to
the international law of genocide, therefore, will certainly serve
as a guideline for other courts and legal practitioners in dealing
with future cases concerning genocide.
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